6 minutes
SIOUX FALLS — During a Thursday night debate, the Republican candidate in the race for South Dakota’s lone seat in the U.S. House of Representatives joined a chorus of his party’s members in criticizing President Donald Trump’s approach on beef imports. Republican Attorney General Marty Jackley faces Democrat Nikki Gronli in the Nov. 3 general […]
6 minutes
SIOUX FALLS — During a Thursday night debate, the Republican candidate in the race for South Dakota’s lone seat in the U.S. House of Representatives joined a chorus of his party’s members in criticizing President Donald Trump’s approach on beef imports. Republican Attorney General Marty Jackley faces Democrat Nikki Gronli in the Nov. 3 general […]
11 minutes
La novela gráfica de Anthony Bourdain llega a la animación con Get Jiro, una historia ambientada en un Los Ángeles postapocalíptico donde los grandes chefs controlan el poder y la comida determina el estatus social.
La novela gráfica de Anthony Bourdain llega a la animación con Get Jiro, una historia ambientada en un Los Ángeles postapocalíptico donde los grandes chefs controlan el poder y la comida determina el estatus social.
12 minutes
El actor dará vida al comandante de campo Duke en la nueva adaptación de la franquicia de Hasbro.
El actor dará vida al comandante de campo Duke en la nueva adaptación de la franquicia de Hasbro.
15 minutes
กมธ.ดีอี ชี้รัฐลงทุนระบบดิจิทัลซ้ำซ้อน เสนอปรับกระบวนการจัดทำงบประมาณ เพิ่มประสิทธิภาพใช้จ่ายภาครัฐ
15 minutes
กมธ.ดีอี ชี้รัฐลงทุนระบบดิจิทัลซ้ำซ้อน เสนอปรับกระบวนการจัดทำงบประมาณ เพิ่มประสิทธิภาพใช้จ่ายภาครัฐ
15 minutes
ผลสำรวจ KPI Poll ชี้ประชาชนเกือบ 3 ใน 4 ไม่เชื่อมั่นว่าเงินบริจาควัดถูกใช้ตรงวัตถุประสงค์
ผลสำรวจ KPI Poll ชี้ประชาชนเกือบ 3 ใน 4 ไม่เชื่อมั่นว่าเงินบริจาควัดถูกใช้ตรงวัตถุประสงค์
16 minutes
România dispută astăzi, la Varșovia, cel de-al treilea meci din Liga Națiunilor, împotriva Poloniei. După înfrângerile cu Suedia și Bosnia și Herțegovina, tricolorii vor să lase în urmă prestațiile modeste din primele două partide și să obțină primele puncte în grupă. Pentru Gică Hagi, meciul de la Varșovia este și un test al deciziilor luate după startul ratat al campaniei: selecționerul a schimbat lotul pentru această partidă, iar România are nevoie acum de o reacție pe teren.
România dispută astăzi, la Varșovia, cel de-al treilea meci din Liga Națiunilor, împotriva Poloniei. După înfrângerile cu Suedia și Bosnia și Herțegovina, tricolorii vor să lase în urmă prestațiile modeste din primele două partide și să obțină primele puncte în grupă. Pentru Gică Hagi, meciul de la Varșovia este și un test al deciziilor luate după startul ratat al campaniei: selecționerul a schimbat lotul pentru această partidă, iar România are nevoie acum de o reacție pe teren.
20 minutes
Cleveland: PPF offers workshops and other artist development programs all based on a 2023 survey asking artists what support they needed. The post Supporting the independent music business in the home of rock and roll appeared first on Signal Cleveland.
Cleveland: PPF offers workshops and other artist development programs all based on a 2023 survey asking artists what support they needed. The post Supporting the independent music business in the home of rock and roll appeared first on Signal Cleveland.
21 minutes
Roll call for the Sept. 2 CMHA Board of Commissioners meeting Agenda CEO Report Highlights of the report from Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority CEO Jeffery Patterson: $3.9 million to clean and prep vacant units for new tenants Documenter K Marie Smith asked: What is the Prepare for Occupancy program? The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority‘s Prepare for […] The post Cuyahoga housing authority approves $9 million for lead testing appeared first on Signal Cleveland.
Roll call for the Sept. 2 CMHA Board of Commissioners meeting Agenda CEO Report Highlights of the report from Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority CEO Jeffery Patterson: $3.9 million to clean and prep vacant units for new tenants Documenter K Marie Smith asked: What is the Prepare for Occupancy program? The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority‘s Prepare for […] The post Cuyahoga housing authority approves $9 million for lead testing appeared first on Signal Cleveland.
22 minutes
Más allá de la llegada masiva a Ceuta, la verdadera crisis es la incapacidad institucional para responder con agilidad. Estar preparado no exige recursos ilimitados, sino capacidades latentes, coordinación multinivel y espacios técnicos protegidos de la política. Las imágenes de la llegada masiva de personas migrantes desde Marruecos a Ceuta los días 30 y 31 de julio de 2026 se han asociado a la palabra “crisis.” La tragedia de los fallecimientos en el mar, las tensiones por la permanencia en la ciudad de los recién llegados y la percepción de inmovilismo estatal proyectaron un marco de aparente incapacidad y falta de preparación. Al examinar la situación, emergen preguntas sobre la construcción de este suceso como una crisis: ¿hablamos de una crisis migratoria por el volumen de llegadas, de acogida por la respuesta institucional, o del modelo de gestión de las fronteras? ¿De una crisis geopolítica que aviva la pugna partidista española? ¿O de la incapacidad de coordinar una respuesta cuyo propio contenido y modelo están en disputa? Una crisis es, por definición, la construcción social de una amenaza que genera un sentido de urgencia respecto a su resolución. En este contexto, la ciudadanía mira especialmente al Estado y a sus representantes como los gestores de la solución. En el ámbito de la migración, la crisis ha estado presente casi de forma permanente. Basta con revisar la hemeroteca para encontrar la “Crisis Europea de los Refugiados de 2015”, la “Crisis de la Valla de Melilla” o la “Crisis de los Cayucos”, entre otras. Gestionar este escenario sitúa la migración en lo que estudiosos de la política pública denominan una controversia política intratable: un problema cuya definición y solución generan un intenso conflicto que dificulta la cooperación entre actores gubernamentales, políticos, y sociales. Hablar de la crisis de Ceuta conlleva un componente de intratabilidad. Sin embargo, cabe preguntarse: ¿puede una ciudad como Ceuta estar preparada ante un escenario de esta magnitud? La respuesta abarca cuatro ejes: la definición de la crisis, la construcción y movilización de capacidades, la coordinación vertebradora y la delimitación entre la arena política y la operativa. En primer lugar, ¿de qué tipo de crisis hablamos? Pese a su naturaleza multicausal, la realidad para Ceuta es que este episodio desencadenó una crisis humanitaria de grandes proporciones. Más allá del ruido político y mediático, calificar el suceso así obliga a definir con claridad la amenaza ante la que debíamos prepararnos: no la constituyen las personas que llegan —tras trayectorias de alto riesgo vital—, sino la incapacidad institucional para responder con agilidad a una llegada masiva. Es esta falta de respuesta la que tensiona la capacidad local para acoger, proteger, prestar servicios y garantizar tanto el debido proceso como el derecho de asilo. A esto se suma una dimensión temporal ineludible: sabemos cuándo inicia una crisis, pero no cuándo concluye. En segundo lugar, es imposible estar completamente preparado ante una crisis difícil de predecir en magnitud y momento. Esto plantea un interrogante clave: ¿qué significa estar preparado ante futuros episodios? El estudio del proyecto MunMigra —financiado por el Plan Nacional de R+D+i— analizó las respuestas municipales hacia la población migrante durante la COVID-19. Los hallazgos mostraron que contar con infraestructuras asistenciales previas (planes, programas y presupuestos), experiencia acumulada y redes consolidadas en el territorio facilitó respuestas más proactivas y cercanas a la población migrante. En definitiva, la preparación no exige disponer de un sinnúmero de recursos en espera; implica contar con capacidades latentes que puedan activarse, reorganizarse y escalarse con rapidez cuando la situación lo exija. En tercer lugar, la preparación exige coordinación: la capacidad de actores centrales, como las administraciones públicas, para articular acciones conjuntas, complementarias y diferenciadas. Esto implica movilizar recursos, intercambiar información y crear espacios de cooperación que gestionen conflictos. En definitiva, coordinar responde a dos preguntas: ¿quién hace qué y cómo? En Ceuta, responderlas es complejo por el reparto competencial: el Gobierno central gestiona fronteras, extranjería y asilo, mientras que la Ciudad Autónoma asume servicios sociales y protección de menores. Las primeras semanas de la crisis evidenciaron la necesidad de articulación multinivel: Ceuta reclamó mayor presencia estatal, mientras el Estado desplegó recursos de diversos ministerios. Si bien el 25 de agosto el Gobierno creó un “mando único” para coordinar las actuaciones, este se hizo principalmente bajo una lógica de control y contención fronteriza al declarar la situación de interés para la Seguridad Nacional. La experiencia de la COVID-19 ilustra los retos que plantea la coordinación. El proyecto MunMigra mostró que, durante los dos primeros años de la pandemia, los ayuntamientos percibieron que la cooperación con los gobiernos autonómicos y, especialmente, con el Gobierno central para atender a personas migrantes fue moderada. En cambio, destacaron una alta colaboración con la sociedad civil local producto de un papel complementario en momentos de crisis. La lección es clara: no basta con conocer formalmente quién tiene cada competencia; prepararse implica disponer de relaciones de colaboración que permitan saber quién hace qué sobre el terreno, qué recursos se movilizan y con quién colaborar. Por último, la preparación debe considerar el entorno político en el que la respuesta se desarrolla. Estudios sobre la denominada “crisis de los refugiados” de 2015 ya nos indicaban que, en el caso de la Unión Europea, la capacidad de implementar respuestas sobre el terreno dependía del espacio político existente para desarrollarlas. Prepararse implica asumir que la migración suele sufrir una intensa politización e instrumentalización. Esto no significa pretender eliminar el conflicto, sino distinguir entre la discusión política y los espacios técnicos de coordinación, los cuales necesitan protección institucional para funcionar. La preparación no elimina la discrepancia política, pero debe tenerla en cuenta para construir un nivel operativo que permita desplegar la respuesta cuando sea necesario. En conclusión, este episodio nos enseña que los distintos actores –estatales y no estatales – de la gobernanza migratoria no tienen por qué predecir la próxima crisis. Sin embargo, sí deben construir capacidades locales que permitan responder de forma ágil y humanitaria cuando las previsiones fallen: un proceso gradual y acumulativo que requiere tiempo y continuidad institucional. [1] Nota: Este texto forma parte de las actividades de difusión de los proyectos de investigación MUNMIGRA (PID2021-129092OA-I00/MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/FEDER,UE) y GLOCALMIC (CNS2024-154755), financiados por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, la Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER,UE).
Más allá de la llegada masiva a Ceuta, la verdadera crisis es la incapacidad institucional para responder con agilidad. Estar preparado no exige recursos ilimitados, sino capacidades latentes, coordinación multinivel y espacios técnicos protegidos de la política. Las imágenes de la llegada masiva de personas migrantes desde Marruecos a Ceuta los días 30 y 31 de julio de 2026 se han asociado a la palabra “crisis.” La tragedia de los fallecimientos en el mar, las tensiones por la permanencia en la ciudad de los recién llegados y la percepción de inmovilismo estatal proyectaron un marco de aparente incapacidad y falta de preparación. Al examinar la situación, emergen preguntas sobre la construcción de este suceso como una crisis: ¿hablamos de una crisis migratoria por el volumen de llegadas, de acogida por la respuesta institucional, o del modelo de gestión de las fronteras? ¿De una crisis geopolítica que aviva la pugna partidista española? ¿O de la incapacidad de coordinar una respuesta cuyo propio contenido y modelo están en disputa? Una crisis es, por definición, la construcción social de una amenaza que genera un sentido de urgencia respecto a su resolución. En este contexto, la ciudadanía mira especialmente al Estado y a sus representantes como los gestores de la solución. En el ámbito de la migración, la crisis ha estado presente casi de forma permanente. Basta con revisar la hemeroteca para encontrar la “Crisis Europea de los Refugiados de 2015”, la “Crisis de la Valla de Melilla” o la “Crisis de los Cayucos”, entre otras. Gestionar este escenario sitúa la migración en lo que estudiosos de la política pública denominan una controversia política intratable: un problema cuya definición y solución generan un intenso conflicto que dificulta la cooperación entre actores gubernamentales, políticos, y sociales. Hablar de la crisis de Ceuta conlleva un componente de intratabilidad. Sin embargo, cabe preguntarse: ¿puede una ciudad como Ceuta estar preparada ante un escenario de esta magnitud? La respuesta abarca cuatro ejes: la definición de la crisis, la construcción y movilización de capacidades, la coordinación vertebradora y la delimitación entre la arena política y la operativa. En primer lugar, ¿de qué tipo de crisis hablamos? Pese a su naturaleza multicausal, la realidad para Ceuta es que este episodio desencadenó una crisis humanitaria de grandes proporciones. Más allá del ruido político y mediático, calificar el suceso así obliga a definir con claridad la amenaza ante la que debíamos prepararnos: no la constituyen las personas que llegan —tras trayectorias de alto riesgo vital—, sino la incapacidad institucional para responder con agilidad a una llegada masiva. Es esta falta de respuesta la que tensiona la capacidad local para acoger, proteger, prestar servicios y garantizar tanto el debido proceso como el derecho de asilo. A esto se suma una dimensión temporal ineludible: sabemos cuándo inicia una crisis, pero no cuándo concluye. En segundo lugar, es imposible estar completamente preparado ante una crisis difícil de predecir en magnitud y momento. Esto plantea un interrogante clave: ¿qué significa estar preparado ante futuros episodios? El estudio del proyecto MunMigra —financiado por el Plan Nacional de R+D+i— analizó las respuestas municipales hacia la población migrante durante la COVID-19. Los hallazgos mostraron que contar con infraestructuras asistenciales previas (planes, programas y presupuestos), experiencia acumulada y redes consolidadas en el territorio facilitó respuestas más proactivas y cercanas a la población migrante. En definitiva, la preparación no exige disponer de un sinnúmero de recursos en espera; implica contar con capacidades latentes que puedan activarse, reorganizarse y escalarse con rapidez cuando la situación lo exija. En tercer lugar, la preparación exige coordinación: la capacidad de actores centrales, como las administraciones públicas, para articular acciones conjuntas, complementarias y diferenciadas. Esto implica movilizar recursos, intercambiar información y crear espacios de cooperación que gestionen conflictos. En definitiva, coordinar responde a dos preguntas: ¿quién hace qué y cómo? En Ceuta, responderlas es complejo por el reparto competencial: el Gobierno central gestiona fronteras, extranjería y asilo, mientras que la Ciudad Autónoma asume servicios sociales y protección de menores. Las primeras semanas de la crisis evidenciaron la necesidad de articulación multinivel: Ceuta reclamó mayor presencia estatal, mientras el Estado desplegó recursos de diversos ministerios. Si bien el 25 de agosto el Gobierno creó un “mando único” para coordinar las actuaciones, este se hizo principalmente bajo una lógica de control y contención fronteriza al declarar la situación de interés para la Seguridad Nacional. La experiencia de la COVID-19 ilustra los retos que plantea la coordinación. El proyecto MunMigra mostró que, durante los dos primeros años de la pandemia, los ayuntamientos percibieron que la cooperación con los gobiernos autonómicos y, especialmente, con el Gobierno central para atender a personas migrantes fue moderada. En cambio, destacaron una alta colaboración con la sociedad civil local producto de un papel complementario en momentos de crisis. La lección es clara: no basta con conocer formalmente quién tiene cada competencia; prepararse implica disponer de relaciones de colaboración que permitan saber quién hace qué sobre el terreno, qué recursos se movilizan y con quién colaborar. Por último, la preparación debe considerar el entorno político en el que la respuesta se desarrolla. Estudios sobre la denominada “crisis de los refugiados” de 2015 ya nos indicaban que, en el caso de la Unión Europea, la capacidad de implementar respuestas sobre el terreno dependía del espacio político existente para desarrollarlas. Prepararse implica asumir que la migración suele sufrir una intensa politización e instrumentalización. Esto no significa pretender eliminar el conflicto, sino distinguir entre la discusión política y los espacios técnicos de coordinación, los cuales necesitan protección institucional para funcionar. La preparación no elimina la discrepancia política, pero debe tenerla en cuenta para construir un nivel operativo que permita desplegar la respuesta cuando sea necesario. En conclusión, este episodio nos enseña que los distintos actores –estatales y no estatales – de la gobernanza migratoria no tienen por qué predecir la próxima crisis. Sin embargo, sí deben construir capacidades locales que permitan responder de forma ágil y humanitaria cuando las previsiones fallen: un proceso gradual y acumulativo que requiere tiempo y continuidad institucional. [1] Nota: Este texto forma parte de las actividades de difusión de los proyectos de investigación MUNMIGRA (PID2021-129092OA-I00/MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/FEDER,UE) y GLOCALMIC (CNS2024-154755), financiados por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, la Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER,UE).
22 minutes
Un viernes en el que la previsión en Madrid es de una jornada de cielos nubosos o cubiertos, con apertura de claros durante las horas centrales. Las lluvias torrenciales siguen este viernes y la Aemet activa avisos en diez comunidades El otoño se adentra todavía más en el tiempo en la Comunidad de Madrid este viernes, con lluvias que activarán el aviso amarillo y un descenso de las máximas, que se quedarán por debajo de los 30 grados, según la previsión de la Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (AEMET). Así, Aemet ha activado el aviso amarillo por tormentas y lluvias en toda la Comunidad de Madrid, especialmente durante las primeras horas de la mañana, y a partir de las 14 horas, es decir por la tarde. En parte, se debe a que las tormentas y chubascos serán localmente fuertes y podrían ir acompañados de granizo y rachas fuertes de viento. Un viernes en el que la previsión en Madrid es de una jornada de cielos nubosos o cubiertos, con apertura de claros durante las horas centrales. Brumas y probables nieblas en zonas altas de la Sierra a primeras y últimas horas. En cuanto al viento, soplará flojo con predominio del noreste, tendiendo a variable durante las horas centrales y con algún intervalo moderado, por la tarde, en las vegas del sureste. Temperaturas en descenso y lluvia para el fin de semana En lo que respecta a las temperaturas, las mínimas se esperan sin cambios o con un ligero ascenso, subiendo por encima de los 15 grados, pero llegando a un máximo de 17 grados. Por su parte, las máximas seguirán en descenso, que será generalmente ligero, oscilando entre los 24 y 29 grados. En cuanto a los próximos días, lo habitual serán lluvias y chubascos generalizados, que podrían ir acompañados de tormenta, sin descartar tampoco granizo, una situación que se mantendrá por lo menos hasta el domingo, con descenso de las máximas, que se mantendrán por debajo de 30 grados.
22 minutes
Un viernes en el que la previsión en Madrid es de una jornada de cielos nubosos o cubiertos, con apertura de claros durante las horas centrales. Las lluvias torrenciales siguen este viernes y la Aemet activa avisos en diez comunidades El otoño se adentra todavía más en el tiempo en la Comunidad de Madrid este viernes, con lluvias que activarán el aviso amarillo y un descenso de las máximas, que se quedarán por debajo de los 30 grados, según la previsión de la Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (AEMET). Así, Aemet ha activado el aviso amarillo por tormentas y lluvias en toda la Comunidad de Madrid, especialmente durante las primeras horas de la mañana, y a partir de las 14 horas, es decir por la tarde. En parte, se debe a que las tormentas y chubascos serán localmente fuertes y podrían ir acompañados de granizo y rachas fuertes de viento. Un viernes en el que la previsión en Madrid es de una jornada de cielos nubosos o cubiertos, con apertura de claros durante las horas centrales. Brumas y probables nieblas en zonas altas de la Sierra a primeras y últimas horas. En cuanto al viento, soplará flojo con predominio del noreste, tendiendo a variable durante las horas centrales y con algún intervalo moderado, por la tarde, en las vegas del sureste. Temperaturas en descenso y lluvia para el fin de semana En lo que respecta a las temperaturas, las mínimas se esperan sin cambios o con un ligero ascenso, subiendo por encima de los 15 grados, pero llegando a un máximo de 17 grados. Por su parte, las máximas seguirán en descenso, que será generalmente ligero, oscilando entre los 24 y 29 grados. En cuanto a los próximos días, lo habitual serán lluvias y chubascos generalizados, que podrían ir acompañados de tormenta, sin descartar tampoco granizo, una situación que se mantendrá por lo menos hasta el domingo, con descenso de las máximas, que se mantendrán por debajo de 30 grados.
22 minutes
Las provincias más afectadas por las precipitaciones serán Castellón y Tarragona, pero se pide extremar las precauciones en todas las regiones afectadasUn estudio prevé hasta 450.000 muertes debido al calor extremo provocado por El Niño Estos son los centros educativos que suspenden las clases por el temporal en la Comunitat Valenciana España sigue inmersa en un temporal de lluvias “muy adverso”, que está afectando de lleno al tercio oriental peninsular y Baleares. Este viernes se volverán a activar avisos rojos en dos comunidades autónomas durante la mañana: Catalunya y Comunitat Valenciana, que se están llevando la peor parte del episodio de fuertes precipitaciones, con acumulados muy importantes en pocas horas. La Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (Aemet), a través de sus redes sociales y de su portavoz Rubén del Campo, ha pedido extremar las precauciones y seguir las indicaciones que den los servicios de Protección Civil de las diferentes comunidades autónomas, que están pidiendo limitar los desplazamientos en aquellas zonas afectadas y no moverse, si no es estrictamente necesario. Catalunya y la Comunitat Valenciana se llevarán lo peor de las lluvias torrenciales, pero otras ocho regiones tienen avisos hoy por fuertes precipitaciones. Muchos de ellos naranjas y los diferentes gobiernos autonómicos también han pedido extremar las medidas y seguir las recomendaciones que se den a lo largo del viernes. Lluvias muy fuertes Hoy se espera una jornada inestable por la presencia de aire frío en altura y un aporte de humedad del Mediterráneo. Durante la madrugada y a primera hora, se espera que continúen los chubascos y las tormentas del día anterior en la Comunitat Valenciana y Tarragona. De acuerdo con la Aemet, estos serán de intensidad torrencial y dejarán acumulaciones muy elevadas, especialmente en las provincias de Castellón y Tarragona. A partir del mediodía, la intensidad empezará a disminuir y las tormentas se desplazarán hacia la costa, donde podría darse algún chubasco fuerte durante la tarde. También de madrugada, se prevén chubascos localmente fuertes en Madrid y otros puntos del tercio este. La tarde también será muy complicada, anticipa la Aemet. De acuerdo con la previsión de la agencia, son probables los chubascos acompañados de tormenta y granizo, fuertes en ambas mesetas, Aragón y el sistema Ibérico y muy fuertes en el sureste y Baleares. Hay avisos naranjas y amarillos en las siguientes comunidades durante la tarde: Región de Murcia, Andalucía, Castilla - La Mancha, Aragón, Baleares, Castilla y León, Extremadura y Comunidad de Madrid. Respecto a las temperaturas, las máximas descenderán en el arco mediterráneo y Baleares y subirán en el resto, de forma notable en el alto Ebro. Las mínimas subirán en el oeste y bajarán en el este y Baleares. En Canarias, apenas habrá cambios en las temperaturas, apunta la Aemet.
Las provincias más afectadas por las precipitaciones serán Castellón y Tarragona, pero se pide extremar las precauciones en todas las regiones afectadasUn estudio prevé hasta 450.000 muertes debido al calor extremo provocado por El Niño Estos son los centros educativos que suspenden las clases por el temporal en la Comunitat Valenciana España sigue inmersa en un temporal de lluvias “muy adverso”, que está afectando de lleno al tercio oriental peninsular y Baleares. Este viernes se volverán a activar avisos rojos en dos comunidades autónomas durante la mañana: Catalunya y Comunitat Valenciana, que se están llevando la peor parte del episodio de fuertes precipitaciones, con acumulados muy importantes en pocas horas. La Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (Aemet), a través de sus redes sociales y de su portavoz Rubén del Campo, ha pedido extremar las precauciones y seguir las indicaciones que den los servicios de Protección Civil de las diferentes comunidades autónomas, que están pidiendo limitar los desplazamientos en aquellas zonas afectadas y no moverse, si no es estrictamente necesario. Catalunya y la Comunitat Valenciana se llevarán lo peor de las lluvias torrenciales, pero otras ocho regiones tienen avisos hoy por fuertes precipitaciones. Muchos de ellos naranjas y los diferentes gobiernos autonómicos también han pedido extremar las medidas y seguir las recomendaciones que se den a lo largo del viernes. Lluvias muy fuertes Hoy se espera una jornada inestable por la presencia de aire frío en altura y un aporte de humedad del Mediterráneo. Durante la madrugada y a primera hora, se espera que continúen los chubascos y las tormentas del día anterior en la Comunitat Valenciana y Tarragona. De acuerdo con la Aemet, estos serán de intensidad torrencial y dejarán acumulaciones muy elevadas, especialmente en las provincias de Castellón y Tarragona. A partir del mediodía, la intensidad empezará a disminuir y las tormentas se desplazarán hacia la costa, donde podría darse algún chubasco fuerte durante la tarde. También de madrugada, se prevén chubascos localmente fuertes en Madrid y otros puntos del tercio este. La tarde también será muy complicada, anticipa la Aemet. De acuerdo con la previsión de la agencia, son probables los chubascos acompañados de tormenta y granizo, fuertes en ambas mesetas, Aragón y el sistema Ibérico y muy fuertes en el sureste y Baleares. Hay avisos naranjas y amarillos en las siguientes comunidades durante la tarde: Región de Murcia, Andalucía, Castilla - La Mancha, Aragón, Baleares, Castilla y León, Extremadura y Comunidad de Madrid. Respecto a las temperaturas, las máximas descenderán en el arco mediterráneo y Baleares y subirán en el resto, de forma notable en el alto Ebro. Las mínimas subirán en el oeste y bajarán en el este y Baleares. En Canarias, apenas habrá cambios en las temperaturas, apunta la Aemet.
22 minutes
Government expedited pathway advances legal status for 140,000 migrants, but 345,000 still await processing A Cabinet-approved expedited programme has helped hundreds of thousands of long-term migrants and their children obtain permanent residence and Thai nationality, but documentation problems, administrative gaps, and implementation challenges continue to limit their access to rights.On 30 June 2026, the Cabinet approved a one-year extension of the deadline for the expedited pathway aimed at resolving nationality and legal status issues for long-term migrants and children born in Thailand, extending the programme until 30 June 2027.The decision follows a proposal by the National Security Council. The current administration, led by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, has continued an initiative introduced under the previous government of Srettha Thavisin, based on the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024.While the extension is a one-off measure, it offers a degree of relief. Among more than 483,000 migrants and children born in Thailand from 19 ethnic minority groups included in Srettha’s government initiative, only around 140,000 cases have been completed to date. On paper, the resolution reduces processing time from 270 days to just 5 days for permanent residence applications, and from 180 days to 5 days for citizenship applications. In reality, waiting times can be significantly longer.The policy covers four main groups: migrants recorded in surveys conducted between 1984 and 1999 (approximately 120,000 persons, classified as ID category 6); migrants surveyed between 2005 and 2011 (around 215,000, classified as ID category 0, group 89); children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand (about 29,000); and children born in Thailand to individuals without civil registration status, of whom about 113,000 had already been surveyed.All criteria and qualifications remain unchanged. For example, long-term migrants may be granted a Certificate of Residence provided they meet conditions such as being unable to return to their country of origin and lacking evidence of holding or having used any other nationality. Children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand may be eligible for Thai nationality if their parents were included in registration surveys conducted up to 1999 and in subsequent surveys carried out between 2005 and 2011.A Prachatai interview with Dr Prommin Lertsuridej, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister during the Srettha Thavisin administration, highlighted that the fast-track programme has faced significant delays due to bureaucratic processes and widespread public misunderstanding, particularly following the controversy over a network that allegedly helped Chinese families obtain Thai citizenship for their children through fraudulent birth registrations. The Cabinet tasked the Department of Provincial Administration with developing guidelines for screening and managing the remaining cases, accelerating updates to registration databases to ensure accuracy, and strictly enforcing laws to mitigate security risks posed by ill-intentioned actors and criminal networks.While many individuals have obtained permanent residence status, some recipients continue to face barriers to accessing everyday services. Others remain unable to benefit from the Cabinet resolution because they fall outside the eligible groups or face difficulties meeting the required conditions. Civil society actors working closely with communities to support state implementation, as well as provincial authorities, also face operational challenges and have called for further support. The ‘new card’ changes lives.Ploy, who lives in Fang District, Chiang Mai and is in her early 40s, is among those who have obtained permanent residence under the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024 on resolving nationality and legal status issues.Ploy’s parents migrated from Shan State to Thailand for work in 1987, when she was just six months old. When Ploy entered the education system, she was included in the 2005 survey, which granted her a 0-89 card, an ID card for individuals without civil registration status who are temporarily permitted to reside in Thailand.Holders of the 0-89 card can access basic education and live and work in Thailand, but face restrictions on travelling outside designated areas. Although later policy changes allowed travel within the province, travelling beyond the province still required formal permission.“When we just arrived, 0-89 cardholders faced some hardship all the same. If we wanted to go into Chiang Mai city, we had to request a travel permit from the district every time. Travel was difficult. Healthcare rights were also not as comprehensive as they are now,” said Ploy. The 2024 Cabinet resolution opened a pathway for Ploy to apply for permanent residence under Section 17 of the 1979 Immigration Act. She submitted her application in September 2025 but was discouraged by delays caused by discrepancies between her parents’ current names and misspellings in official records.Correcting the records required verifying her parents’ identities and presenting them in person as witnesses. “Officials asked how they could know that we were really parents and daughter. … So I brought my mother there to be questioned. Luckily, our faces are similar.”Unlike in the past, when dismissive attitudes discouraged her from approaching authorities, she notes that her interactions with district officials have improved. Officials are more willing to provide guidance, and she feels more confident asserting her rights. “Maybe it’s because of the law,” she said. “Now I feel that they are more open. They listen more to people like me.”Now, with a “Type 8 card”, an ID card confirming her permanent residence status, Ploy can travel freely across provinces without seeking permission. She can also purchase property and register a motorcycle under her own name, something she previously had to do through her Thai husband. “I feel proud,” said Ploy.Ploy will be eligible to apply for Thai citizenship after holding permanent residence for five years and meeting other criteria. Holders of the Type 8 card still cannot obtain a standard Thai passport. Instead, they must apply for a Travel Document for Aliens, which is valid for one year. She is undecided for now, but says that if her children pursue opportunities abroad, particularly in China, she may consider applying for citizenship to make travelling easier.Disconnects with daily livesObtaining the Type 8 card did not immediately resolve all challenges.Mot, a 30-year-old Shan woman who moved to Thailand with her parents in 2003 and now lives in Fang, is one such recipient. Her application process was smoother than Ploy’s, partly due to consistent documentation. She also said she paid around 5,000 baht to a local intermediary who helped facilitate the process. Other sources reported similar experiences.In practice, however, the new status did not translate into immediate access to everyday services. Previously, her 0 card allowed her to purchase local transport tickets, though travel outside designated areas required special permission. After receiving a card that formally granted unrestricted travel, she found herself unable to buy bus or train tickets because they require a national ID card. “Suppose that I want to.go to Bangkok, I could use my personal car to go there, but if I would like to take the bus, they would not let me o buy a ticket,” she said of the initial issue, which was resolved several months later.Similar problems arose with mobile services. “I bought a new SIM card for my phone. At first, they did not allow me to register, but they allowed it just 2-3 months ago. When I just received my Type 8 card, I still couldn’t do anything. I couldn’t even buy a SIM card,” said Mot. Banking access also remains limited. She is still unable to open a new account using the Type 8 card and must rely on her previous account linked to her old ID.“To open a bank account, you either need to be stateless or Thai, but my nationality is Myanmarese. So I still can’t do anything about it. To be able to do it, I’d need a work permit and salary slips. It’s complicated, so I haven’t done it yet.”After 20 years, citizenship still out of reachKoi, a 44-year-old Shan volunteer teacher who moved to Thailand in 1985, has held permanent residence since 2004. She completed a bachelor’s degree in Thailand, speaks fluent Thai, and has taught generations of ethnic minority children. Yet she remains unable to apply for Thai citizenship despite holding permanent residence for more than two decades.A common misconception is that simply holding permanent residence for five years is sufficient to apply for citizenship. Koi received the same information from authorities when she obtained her permanent residence. In reality, applicants must also meet several additional criteria under the 1965 Nationality Act and its amendments, including a minimum monthly income of 20,000 baht, proof of tax payments for at least three years, and official salary certification.“I am limitated in that my salary isn’t enough,” said Koi. Her brother, who obtained his Type 8 card at the same time as she did, was also unable to obtain citizenship after his application was rejected for the same reason.“Mr brother’s earnings weren’t enough. My brother’s case is clear because he had a definite employer. His salary comes in monthly with payslips. But I work as a volunteer teacher. My income is not much. And it does not come with payslips. I don’t have those kinds of evidence.”“Emotionally, I understand. For us to become Thai, we should have a job and income so we’re not a burden on Thai society. But the income threshold should not be this high. It should be around 15,000 baht without any deductions.”Koi estimates that in her community alone, Ban Lan, Village No. 5, Mon Pin Subdistrict, Fang District, more than a hundred people have held permanent residence for many years but face similar challenges.Not eligible, but still benefitingKat, a Shan woman originally from Namsang in Shan State, moved to Thailand at the age of six with her parents. Despite having spent most of her life in Thailand, she remains classified as a migrant worker.She holds two key documents used together: a Certificate of Identity (CI), often referred to as the “green Myanmar passport”, and a pink ID card (a non-Thai national identification card with a 00 prefix). Although she is not eligible for the legal status development process under the 2024 Cabinet resolution, Kat nonetheless speaks with relief and happiness about the policy’s impact on her family.Her husband, also from Shan State, previously held a 0-89 card after a school assisted with his registration when he was enrolled as a student. This enabled him to apply for and obtain permanent residence. Once he obtained it, their three children, who share his surname and have proof of birth in Thailand, became eligible to apply for Thai citizenship based on descent. The children submitted their applications in October last year and received their Thai national ID cards in late April 2026.Before her husband obtained permanent residence, Kat said “officials told us that the children would need to finish a bachelor’s degree before they could apply for Thai citizenship. Every time we went, they said only these words.” It was only after the 2004 Cabinet resolution that officials told him he could apply for permanent residence, eventually making their children eligible for Thai citizenship more quickly.Challenges faced by civil societyMay, a 40-year-old Shan woman, has worked with a civil society organisation for around two decades, focusing on legal status and documentation issues. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, she and a small team became actively involved in helping ethnic communities navigate the process of obtaining legal recognition.The first important step was communicating with ethnic communities. May recalled that when the information was first provided, the number of applicants remained low. Many people who had been surveyed in official records up until 1999, and therefore held Type 6 cards, did not understand why they needed to apply for Type 8 cards. Some were also concerned about the potential costs associated with submitting an application.May explained to them that if Type 6 card holders did not apply for Type 8 cards to obtain permanent residence, their cases could be subject to review, and their records could be removed if authorities determined that they were no longer present. Once villagers understood, they realised that they needed to submit applications. “Having only a Type 6 card was enough for them to stay because they would not expel them. At first, that was what they thought. They really thought that”, May said.Even though the state had already hired additional staff specifically for this work, government personnel remained insufficient. As a result, she and her team provided additional support to the Fang District Office, contributing their own resources, including personnel and funding to hire additional staff.“The District Office was happy for us to help … But when we went to help, our organisation had to pass a screening process to ensure that we were genuinely coming to help,” said May. “When I have funding, I go there every day. But I do not have funding at the moment. Now we can only help the District Office one day a week because we cannot pay for staff expenses.”According to the Fang District Registration Office, as of 30 June 2025, there were 22,993 people in the District who fell within the target groups, including those applying for permanent residence certificates and Thai nationality. However, the number of applications received so far stood at only 11,589 cases, meaning that more than 10,000 eligible individuals had yet to submit applications.“Why have they not come to apply? Or have they run away? Or have they returned to their country of origin? Or have they passed away? This number needs to become zero.” May highlighted the responsibility of local authorities to resolve the remaining cases.A lone interpreterBoy, a 30-year-old Shan interpreter, has worked in Fang District for over a decade with support from civil society organisations. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, he is now overwhelmed as the only interpreter still available in the District amid a surge in applications.At times, people come forward wanting to apply for permanent residence but are unable to express themselves in Thai. Officials may not understand them, leading to frustration and rising tensions. In such moments, his role as an interpreter becomes essential.“It’s not that when they come to inquire, every official will speak nicely. Some do get shouted at. But I have a duty to help with translation. Instead of letting their feelings run high, I may talk to the caseworker or those who come to the officials to inquire, so that they understand each other more and reduce the aggression in what they say. Actually, those who go to inquire, when the officials ask them questions, of course they would answer that they don’t know because they really don’t know.”Boy normally works at the civil registration office and on nationality and legal status work. He explains the required documents and procedures to Shan applicants before their cases are forwarded to officials for processing. At the processing stage, he accompanies them to meetings with district officials or the district chief. When he has to follow ongoing cases, other people seeking assistance are left waiting longer.Boy also produces Facebook posts and graphics explaining the required documents and procedures in the Shan language to help people in other districts. Although he speaks Thai fluently and plays a significant role in supporting administrative processes, Boy himself does not qualify for the same legal status he helps others obtain.Born in Shan State, he moved to Thailand to pursue his education at the age of seven or eight. He currently holds a pink ID card (Type 6 card for non-Thai nationals). If he wishes to improve his legal status, his only available pathway would be naturalisation. However, his income remains below the required threshold.“Actually, I do want citizenship. I understand that people not born in Thailand cannot directly obtain Thai nationality. But if they contribute to society and the community, I think that I’m also one of them. I think they should be considered,” said Boy. Progress limited in Chiang MaiAccording to the Chiang Mai Provincial Administration Office, the Province has a target group of 88,524 individuals covered under the 2024 Cabinet resolution. Of these, 75,749 people are applying for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status, while 12,775 are applying for Thai nationality.Progress remains limited. Between 30 June 2025 and 16 June 2026, a total of 35,622 applications were approved, 31,117 for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status and 4,505 for Thai nationality.Chiang Mai provincial officials identified several key obstacles at the local level, particularly incomplete documentation. These include missing information on the year of entry into Thailand, uncertainty about countries of origin or point of entry, a lack of clear records on length of stay or residential history, and errors in the Survey Form for Compiling Personal Records of Persons Without Civil Registration Status (Form 89).Other issues involve inconsistencies between different sets of records. Officials found cases where documents indicated that an individual was born in Thailand while immigration data showed entry from abroad. There were also mismatched names of applicants, parents, or guardians between survey forms and civil registration databases.Another challenge involves misunderstandings about eligibility conditions and the application process among applicants, which have contributed to some individuals relying on informal agents. In some cases, this has raised concerns about informal payments, exploitation, and complaints, making oversight by the district authorities more difficult.In response to these challenges, Chiang Mai Province has proposed several improvements, from resource allocation to technical and procedural reforms.One key recommendation is to strengthen administrative capacity by increasing staffing levels and improving collaboration with private organisations, local administrative bodies, and community leaders. The Province also proposed providing additional equipment and mobile registration units that can operate directly in villages, helping reach applicants who face difficulties travelling to government offices.Chiang Mai also recommended extending or removing application deadlines to allow ongoing applications from eligible individuals. It proposed allowing community-level verification through village committees rather than relying on a single individual witness, as well as reducing the number of witnesses required during interviews and simplifying approval authority at the registrar level.Another proposed reform concerns data management and verification procedures. The Province suggested allowing local registration offices to directly amend Form 89 data without forwarding all cases to the central authorities. It also recommended clearer verification processes, such as interviewing parents or guardians to confirm birth and immigration histories. Finally, the Province called for improved digital connectivity between the Department of Provincial Administration and the Royal Thai Police to facilitate background and criminal record checks.Note: Pseudonyms are used for all sources to protect their identities and ensure their safety. eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-02 - 11:01 Feature stateless people indigenous people Chiang mai
Government expedited pathway advances legal status for 140,000 migrants, but 345,000 still await processing A Cabinet-approved expedited programme has helped hundreds of thousands of long-term migrants and their children obtain permanent residence and Thai nationality, but documentation problems, administrative gaps, and implementation challenges continue to limit their access to rights.On 30 June 2026, the Cabinet approved a one-year extension of the deadline for the expedited pathway aimed at resolving nationality and legal status issues for long-term migrants and children born in Thailand, extending the programme until 30 June 2027.The decision follows a proposal by the National Security Council. The current administration, led by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, has continued an initiative introduced under the previous government of Srettha Thavisin, based on the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024.While the extension is a one-off measure, it offers a degree of relief. Among more than 483,000 migrants and children born in Thailand from 19 ethnic minority groups included in Srettha’s government initiative, only around 140,000 cases have been completed to date. On paper, the resolution reduces processing time from 270 days to just 5 days for permanent residence applications, and from 180 days to 5 days for citizenship applications. In reality, waiting times can be significantly longer.The policy covers four main groups: migrants recorded in surveys conducted between 1984 and 1999 (approximately 120,000 persons, classified as ID category 6); migrants surveyed between 2005 and 2011 (around 215,000, classified as ID category 0, group 89); children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand (about 29,000); and children born in Thailand to individuals without civil registration status, of whom about 113,000 had already been surveyed.All criteria and qualifications remain unchanged. For example, long-term migrants may be granted a Certificate of Residence provided they meet conditions such as being unable to return to their country of origin and lacking evidence of holding or having used any other nationality. Children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand may be eligible for Thai nationality if their parents were included in registration surveys conducted up to 1999 and in subsequent surveys carried out between 2005 and 2011.A Prachatai interview with Dr Prommin Lertsuridej, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister during the Srettha Thavisin administration, highlighted that the fast-track programme has faced significant delays due to bureaucratic processes and widespread public misunderstanding, particularly following the controversy over a network that allegedly helped Chinese families obtain Thai citizenship for their children through fraudulent birth registrations. The Cabinet tasked the Department of Provincial Administration with developing guidelines for screening and managing the remaining cases, accelerating updates to registration databases to ensure accuracy, and strictly enforcing laws to mitigate security risks posed by ill-intentioned actors and criminal networks.While many individuals have obtained permanent residence status, some recipients continue to face barriers to accessing everyday services. Others remain unable to benefit from the Cabinet resolution because they fall outside the eligible groups or face difficulties meeting the required conditions. Civil society actors working closely with communities to support state implementation, as well as provincial authorities, also face operational challenges and have called for further support. The ‘new card’ changes lives.Ploy, who lives in Fang District, Chiang Mai and is in her early 40s, is among those who have obtained permanent residence under the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024 on resolving nationality and legal status issues.Ploy’s parents migrated from Shan State to Thailand for work in 1987, when she was just six months old. When Ploy entered the education system, she was included in the 2005 survey, which granted her a 0-89 card, an ID card for individuals without civil registration status who are temporarily permitted to reside in Thailand.Holders of the 0-89 card can access basic education and live and work in Thailand, but face restrictions on travelling outside designated areas. Although later policy changes allowed travel within the province, travelling beyond the province still required formal permission.“When we just arrived, 0-89 cardholders faced some hardship all the same. If we wanted to go into Chiang Mai city, we had to request a travel permit from the district every time. Travel was difficult. Healthcare rights were also not as comprehensive as they are now,” said Ploy. The 2024 Cabinet resolution opened a pathway for Ploy to apply for permanent residence under Section 17 of the 1979 Immigration Act. She submitted her application in September 2025 but was discouraged by delays caused by discrepancies between her parents’ current names and misspellings in official records.Correcting the records required verifying her parents’ identities and presenting them in person as witnesses. “Officials asked how they could know that we were really parents and daughter. … So I brought my mother there to be questioned. Luckily, our faces are similar.”Unlike in the past, when dismissive attitudes discouraged her from approaching authorities, she notes that her interactions with district officials have improved. Officials are more willing to provide guidance, and she feels more confident asserting her rights. “Maybe it’s because of the law,” she said. “Now I feel that they are more open. They listen more to people like me.”Now, with a “Type 8 card”, an ID card confirming her permanent residence status, Ploy can travel freely across provinces without seeking permission. She can also purchase property and register a motorcycle under her own name, something she previously had to do through her Thai husband. “I feel proud,” said Ploy.Ploy will be eligible to apply for Thai citizenship after holding permanent residence for five years and meeting other criteria. Holders of the Type 8 card still cannot obtain a standard Thai passport. Instead, they must apply for a Travel Document for Aliens, which is valid for one year. She is undecided for now, but says that if her children pursue opportunities abroad, particularly in China, she may consider applying for citizenship to make travelling easier.Disconnects with daily livesObtaining the Type 8 card did not immediately resolve all challenges.Mot, a 30-year-old Shan woman who moved to Thailand with her parents in 2003 and now lives in Fang, is one such recipient. Her application process was smoother than Ploy’s, partly due to consistent documentation. She also said she paid around 5,000 baht to a local intermediary who helped facilitate the process. Other sources reported similar experiences.In practice, however, the new status did not translate into immediate access to everyday services. Previously, her 0 card allowed her to purchase local transport tickets, though travel outside designated areas required special permission. After receiving a card that formally granted unrestricted travel, she found herself unable to buy bus or train tickets because they require a national ID card. “Suppose that I want to.go to Bangkok, I could use my personal car to go there, but if I would like to take the bus, they would not let me o buy a ticket,” she said of the initial issue, which was resolved several months later.Similar problems arose with mobile services. “I bought a new SIM card for my phone. At first, they did not allow me to register, but they allowed it just 2-3 months ago. When I just received my Type 8 card, I still couldn’t do anything. I couldn’t even buy a SIM card,” said Mot. Banking access also remains limited. She is still unable to open a new account using the Type 8 card and must rely on her previous account linked to her old ID.“To open a bank account, you either need to be stateless or Thai, but my nationality is Myanmarese. So I still can’t do anything about it. To be able to do it, I’d need a work permit and salary slips. It’s complicated, so I haven’t done it yet.”After 20 years, citizenship still out of reachKoi, a 44-year-old Shan volunteer teacher who moved to Thailand in 1985, has held permanent residence since 2004. She completed a bachelor’s degree in Thailand, speaks fluent Thai, and has taught generations of ethnic minority children. Yet she remains unable to apply for Thai citizenship despite holding permanent residence for more than two decades.A common misconception is that simply holding permanent residence for five years is sufficient to apply for citizenship. Koi received the same information from authorities when she obtained her permanent residence. In reality, applicants must also meet several additional criteria under the 1965 Nationality Act and its amendments, including a minimum monthly income of 20,000 baht, proof of tax payments for at least three years, and official salary certification.“I am limitated in that my salary isn’t enough,” said Koi. Her brother, who obtained his Type 8 card at the same time as she did, was also unable to obtain citizenship after his application was rejected for the same reason.“Mr brother’s earnings weren’t enough. My brother’s case is clear because he had a definite employer. His salary comes in monthly with payslips. But I work as a volunteer teacher. My income is not much. And it does not come with payslips. I don’t have those kinds of evidence.”“Emotionally, I understand. For us to become Thai, we should have a job and income so we’re not a burden on Thai society. But the income threshold should not be this high. It should be around 15,000 baht without any deductions.”Koi estimates that in her community alone, Ban Lan, Village No. 5, Mon Pin Subdistrict, Fang District, more than a hundred people have held permanent residence for many years but face similar challenges.Not eligible, but still benefitingKat, a Shan woman originally from Namsang in Shan State, moved to Thailand at the age of six with her parents. Despite having spent most of her life in Thailand, she remains classified as a migrant worker.She holds two key documents used together: a Certificate of Identity (CI), often referred to as the “green Myanmar passport”, and a pink ID card (a non-Thai national identification card with a 00 prefix). Although she is not eligible for the legal status development process under the 2024 Cabinet resolution, Kat nonetheless speaks with relief and happiness about the policy’s impact on her family.Her husband, also from Shan State, previously held a 0-89 card after a school assisted with his registration when he was enrolled as a student. This enabled him to apply for and obtain permanent residence. Once he obtained it, their three children, who share his surname and have proof of birth in Thailand, became eligible to apply for Thai citizenship based on descent. The children submitted their applications in October last year and received their Thai national ID cards in late April 2026.Before her husband obtained permanent residence, Kat said “officials told us that the children would need to finish a bachelor’s degree before they could apply for Thai citizenship. Every time we went, they said only these words.” It was only after the 2004 Cabinet resolution that officials told him he could apply for permanent residence, eventually making their children eligible for Thai citizenship more quickly.Challenges faced by civil societyMay, a 40-year-old Shan woman, has worked with a civil society organisation for around two decades, focusing on legal status and documentation issues. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, she and a small team became actively involved in helping ethnic communities navigate the process of obtaining legal recognition.The first important step was communicating with ethnic communities. May recalled that when the information was first provided, the number of applicants remained low. Many people who had been surveyed in official records up until 1999, and therefore held Type 6 cards, did not understand why they needed to apply for Type 8 cards. Some were also concerned about the potential costs associated with submitting an application.May explained to them that if Type 6 card holders did not apply for Type 8 cards to obtain permanent residence, their cases could be subject to review, and their records could be removed if authorities determined that they were no longer present. Once villagers understood, they realised that they needed to submit applications. “Having only a Type 6 card was enough for them to stay because they would not expel them. At first, that was what they thought. They really thought that”, May said.Even though the state had already hired additional staff specifically for this work, government personnel remained insufficient. As a result, she and her team provided additional support to the Fang District Office, contributing their own resources, including personnel and funding to hire additional staff.“The District Office was happy for us to help … But when we went to help, our organisation had to pass a screening process to ensure that we were genuinely coming to help,” said May. “When I have funding, I go there every day. But I do not have funding at the moment. Now we can only help the District Office one day a week because we cannot pay for staff expenses.”According to the Fang District Registration Office, as of 30 June 2025, there were 22,993 people in the District who fell within the target groups, including those applying for permanent residence certificates and Thai nationality. However, the number of applications received so far stood at only 11,589 cases, meaning that more than 10,000 eligible individuals had yet to submit applications.“Why have they not come to apply? Or have they run away? Or have they returned to their country of origin? Or have they passed away? This number needs to become zero.” May highlighted the responsibility of local authorities to resolve the remaining cases.A lone interpreterBoy, a 30-year-old Shan interpreter, has worked in Fang District for over a decade with support from civil society organisations. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, he is now overwhelmed as the only interpreter still available in the District amid a surge in applications.At times, people come forward wanting to apply for permanent residence but are unable to express themselves in Thai. Officials may not understand them, leading to frustration and rising tensions. In such moments, his role as an interpreter becomes essential.“It’s not that when they come to inquire, every official will speak nicely. Some do get shouted at. But I have a duty to help with translation. Instead of letting their feelings run high, I may talk to the caseworker or those who come to the officials to inquire, so that they understand each other more and reduce the aggression in what they say. Actually, those who go to inquire, when the officials ask them questions, of course they would answer that they don’t know because they really don’t know.”Boy normally works at the civil registration office and on nationality and legal status work. He explains the required documents and procedures to Shan applicants before their cases are forwarded to officials for processing. At the processing stage, he accompanies them to meetings with district officials or the district chief. When he has to follow ongoing cases, other people seeking assistance are left waiting longer.Boy also produces Facebook posts and graphics explaining the required documents and procedures in the Shan language to help people in other districts. Although he speaks Thai fluently and plays a significant role in supporting administrative processes, Boy himself does not qualify for the same legal status he helps others obtain.Born in Shan State, he moved to Thailand to pursue his education at the age of seven or eight. He currently holds a pink ID card (Type 6 card for non-Thai nationals). If he wishes to improve his legal status, his only available pathway would be naturalisation. However, his income remains below the required threshold.“Actually, I do want citizenship. I understand that people not born in Thailand cannot directly obtain Thai nationality. But if they contribute to society and the community, I think that I’m also one of them. I think they should be considered,” said Boy. Progress limited in Chiang MaiAccording to the Chiang Mai Provincial Administration Office, the Province has a target group of 88,524 individuals covered under the 2024 Cabinet resolution. Of these, 75,749 people are applying for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status, while 12,775 are applying for Thai nationality.Progress remains limited. Between 30 June 2025 and 16 June 2026, a total of 35,622 applications were approved, 31,117 for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status and 4,505 for Thai nationality.Chiang Mai provincial officials identified several key obstacles at the local level, particularly incomplete documentation. These include missing information on the year of entry into Thailand, uncertainty about countries of origin or point of entry, a lack of clear records on length of stay or residential history, and errors in the Survey Form for Compiling Personal Records of Persons Without Civil Registration Status (Form 89).Other issues involve inconsistencies between different sets of records. Officials found cases where documents indicated that an individual was born in Thailand while immigration data showed entry from abroad. There were also mismatched names of applicants, parents, or guardians between survey forms and civil registration databases.Another challenge involves misunderstandings about eligibility conditions and the application process among applicants, which have contributed to some individuals relying on informal agents. In some cases, this has raised concerns about informal payments, exploitation, and complaints, making oversight by the district authorities more difficult.In response to these challenges, Chiang Mai Province has proposed several improvements, from resource allocation to technical and procedural reforms.One key recommendation is to strengthen administrative capacity by increasing staffing levels and improving collaboration with private organisations, local administrative bodies, and community leaders. The Province also proposed providing additional equipment and mobile registration units that can operate directly in villages, helping reach applicants who face difficulties travelling to government offices.Chiang Mai also recommended extending or removing application deadlines to allow ongoing applications from eligible individuals. It proposed allowing community-level verification through village committees rather than relying on a single individual witness, as well as reducing the number of witnesses required during interviews and simplifying approval authority at the registrar level.Another proposed reform concerns data management and verification procedures. The Province suggested allowing local registration offices to directly amend Form 89 data without forwarding all cases to the central authorities. It also recommended clearer verification processes, such as interviewing parents or guardians to confirm birth and immigration histories. Finally, the Province called for improved digital connectivity between the Department of Provincial Administration and the Royal Thai Police to facilitate background and criminal record checks.Note: Pseudonyms are used for all sources to protect their identities and ensure their safety. eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-02 - 11:01 Feature stateless people indigenous people Chiang mai
22 minutes
The question should not simply be whether Connecticut increases the ECS formula, but whether that reflects the actual cost of educating a child.
The question should not simply be whether Connecticut increases the ECS formula, but whether that reflects the actual cost of educating a child.
23 minutes
Chemisch gesehen sind Schaumblasen und normale Seifenblasen ähnlich aufgebaut. Doch im Schaum hängen viele Blasen aneinander, und genau das macht sie stärker. Was passiert genau?
Chemisch gesehen sind Schaumblasen und normale Seifenblasen ähnlich aufgebaut. Doch im Schaum hängen viele Blasen aneinander, und genau das macht sie stärker. Was passiert genau?
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Чеченский омбудсмен против спецдокладчика ООН, обращение в защиту арестованного в Казахстане Мансура Мовлаева, рост тарифов на юге и Кавказе и протест в Дагестане – об этом и не только в еженедельном подкасте Кавказ.Реалии.
23 minutes
Whether you’re a news junkie or just in it for the glory, you’re in the right place. The post Can you name this massive 1930s Cleveland lakefront event? Take the news quiz appeared first on Signal Cleveland.
Whether you’re a news junkie or just in it for the glory, you’re in the right place. The post Can you name this massive 1930s Cleveland lakefront event? Take the news quiz appeared first on Signal Cleveland.
26 minutes
Qui té dret a ser d’aquí sense haver-ho de demostrar cada dia? La pregunta travessa la Catalunya dels vuit milions, encara que una part del país prefereixi continuar parlant dels «forasters», dels «altres» i dels qui, suposadament, han arribat després. Mentrestant, als barris, a les escoles i als llocs de treball ja es construeix un [...] L'entrada Qui té dret a ser d’aquí? ha aparegut primer a El Diari de l'Educació.
26 minutes
Qui té dret a ser d’aquí sense haver-ho de demostrar cada dia? La pregunta travessa la Catalunya dels vuit milions, encara que una part del país prefereixi continuar parlant dels «forasters», dels «altres» i dels qui, suposadament, han arribat després. Mentrestant, als barris, a les escoles i als llocs de treball ja es construeix un [...] L'entrada Qui té dret a ser d’aquí? ha aparegut primer a El Diari de l'Educació.